Abstract-The logically-centralized controllers have largely operated as the coordination points in software-defined networking(SDN), through which applications submit network operations to manage the global network resource. Therefore, the validity of these network operations from SDN applications are critical for the security of SDN. In this paper, we analyze the mechanism that generates network operations in SDN, and present a fine-grained access control model, called Access Control Protector(AC-PROT), that employs an attribute-based signature scheme for network applications. The simulation result demonstrates that AC-PROT can efficiently identify and reject unauthorized network operations generated by applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software-defined networking (SDN) paradigm decouples network control from data forwarding, offering high programmability of control plane and a global view of the network. The basic SDN architecture consists of three layers including the application layer, the control layer and the dataplane layer. The adoption of this paradigm promotes the development of logically centralized and integrated security policies, which simplifies the solution of complex network security problems [1] .
SDN network operations, like flow rule insertion, port configuration and network state inquiry, are generated dynamically by a variety of network applications. The controller receives these network operations from network applications and delivers them to switches in the data-plan layer. Switches in the data-plan layer will subsequently operate according to these network operations and absolutely trust them. However, the current design of SDN does not provide an efficient access control mechanism to mediate these network operations between the application layer and the control layer. SDN network is vulnerable to various attacks such as denial of service, information disclosure attacks and flow-rule forging attacks caused by the compromised network operations from malicious applications [3] , [6] , [8] . Even worse, an adversary may tamper with a set of network operations to control the states of all switches by masquerading as a valid application. Therefore, ensuring the validity of network operations from network applications is definitely one of the main challenges in SDN security.
Many techniques for enhancing the network application security in SDN have been developed in recent years [2] - [5] , [7] , [8] . Porraset et al. proposed a new security system called SE-Floodlight [3] , which extends the Floodlight controller with a role-based authorization scheme, with three default authorization roles among applications, i.e., administrator, security application, and traffic application. Therefore, it may simply treat different applications as the same role. Son et al. implemented FLOVER [5] , a model checking system to verify the aggregation of flow polices instantiated within an SDN network, while Mattos et al. presented a new framework for control applications, enabling software-defined network controllers to use the host identity as a new flow field to define forwarding rules [1] . However, as the network status in SDN changes dynamically, these methods could protect the flow rules in its execution process, but could not prevent malicious applications from taking abnormal network operations into the controller. Compared with them, our work contributes a finegrained access control model to verify the legality of network operations from network applications with multiple attributes in SDN.
In this paper, we present a fine-grained access control model called Access Control Protector(AC-PROT) for SDN applications. AC-PROT manages the access control policies for each network operation defined in SDN and detects the applications whose network operations are against these policies. To achieve these security functionalities, we take advantage of the feature of the logically-centralized SDN structure and introduce an attribute-based signature scheme in AC-PROT. Each application uses this scheme to sign its network operations with its unique attributes in SDN. As a result, the controller can authenticate these applications network operations based on the access control policies and their signatures, thus to prevent malicious applications launching unauthorized network operations to switches in the data-plane layer.
II. ACCESS CONTROL MODEL FOR SDN APPLICATIONS
In this section, we present our design of a fine-grained access control model for network applications running on the controller.
A. System Model 1) Overall Structure: Fig.1 illustrates the conceptual diagram of AC-PROT, which extends the classical SDN architecture with three additional security components: i) an attributebased signature module, and ii) a trusted authority(TA), iii) an application verifier(App-Verifier). It provides two security functionalities: i) managing the access control policy for applications network operations, and ii) verifying the validity of applications network operations. 2) Access Structure: AC-PROT provides digital signature validation for applications to provisionally limit their network operations based upon their attributes. To support the security functionality, we summarize a set of 7 application attributes in the Table I , which may be augmented by the SDN administrator with additional attributes when necessary. Let {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n } be a set of application attributes. An access structure is a collection A of non-empty subsets of {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n }.
In this paper, the set of all applications that produce network operations for the controller is denoted as AP P . An application App i ∈ AP P will be assigned a user access structure A u to generate its attribute-based signature by the network administrator.
3) Access Control Policy: The access control policies define the granted network operations of the application, e.g., read network states, write flow rules, etc. According to the categorization of message communication between applications and the controller presented in previous work [3] , [7] , we define a set of 16 access control policies that would be enforced by AC-PROT on the controller and classify them into three categories, as illustrated in Table II . An attribute tree is used to describe an access control policy. Each non-leaf node of the tree represents a threshold gate. If num x is the number of children of a node x and k x is its threshold value, then 0 < k x < num x . Each leaf node x of the tree is described by an attribute and a threshold value k x = 1. prt(x) represents the parent of the node x in the tree. The children of every node are numbered from 1 to num. The function index(x) returns such a number associated with the node x, where the index values are uniquely assigned to nodes in the attribute tree in an arbitrary manner. The function attr(x) denotes the attribute associated with the leaf node x. We illustrate the logic structure of an attribute tree in Fig.2 . A policy access structure A p represents the attribute collection set of all the leaf nodes in an attribute tree.
Let T x be the subtree of T rooted at the node x. If an access structure A satisfies the access tree T x , we denote it as T x (A) = 1. We compute T x (A) recursively by the Satisfying an Attribute Tree (SAT) Algorithm defined as follows. If x is a non-leaf node, evaluate T x (A) for all children z of node x, returns 1 if at least k x children return 1; If x is a leaf node, then T x (A) returns 1 if att(x) ∈ A.
B. Attribute-Based Signature Scheme
Our attribute-based signature scheme is an extension of the signature scheme proposed by Cao et al. [9] and the attribute-based encryption scheme presented by Junbeom et al. [10] . It consists of the following five polynomial time algorithms which is based on bilinear groups and computational Diff-Hellman(CDH) problem: Setup, Public-Key-Generation, Private-Key-Generation, Operation-Signing, and Operation-Verification. First, we assume that operation messages produced by valid applications are n-bit strings. Then, Table III summarizes several notations and their corresponding meanings that will be used in the paper. Our attribute-based signature scheme includes the following steps.
Setup: TA generates two groups G, and G T of prime order p, and constructs a bilinear map e : G × G → G T , and randomly chooses a generator g of G. Then, α ∈ Z q is randomly chosen by TA as a secret. TA sets g 1 = g α and picks g 2 randomly in G, and computes V = e(g 1 , g 2 ). After that, TA defines the system access structure A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n } for some integer n and a hash function H : {0, 1} * → G. For each a i ∈ A, TA chooses a random element r i ∈ Z q and calculates R i = g ri . Therefore, the public parameters
), and the master secret key consists of the following components msk = (α, {r i } n i=1 ). We summary the setup algorithm as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Setup
Input: κ: the security parameter Output: params, msk 1) generate two groups: G and G T 2) construct a bilinear map e 3) randomly choose a generator g of G and α ∈ Z q 4) compute
where A is the system access structure, do 9) randomly choose r i ∈ Z q 10) compute
Public-Key-Generation: An applications network operation is regarded as authorized when its access structure satisfies the access control policy. Receiving an attribute tree defined by the network administrator, TA uses Public-Key-Generation algorithm to compute the corresponding policy public key. The Public-Key-Generation algorithm of our approach is shown in Algorithm 2, which proceeds as follows.
For a defined attribute tree, TA chooses a polynomial p x of degree d x = k x − 1 for each node x in an attribute tree, where k x is the threshold value. That is done in a top-down manner. Starting from the root p root (0) = α and d root , other points in the polynomial will be random. For any other node x, set p x(0) = p prt(x) (index(x)) and choose d x for other points randomly. Then, let Y be the set of leaf nodes in T p . Once the polynomials have been decided, the public key for the attribute tree is pk p = {D y = g py(0) , D i = R py(0) i }, and the policy access structure is A p = {a i }, where i is the subscript of a i = att(y), and y is a leaf node.
Algorithm 2 Public-Key-Generation Input: T p Output: pk p , Ap 1) for each node x ∈ T p in a top-down manner, do 2) choose a polynomial p x of degree d x = k x − 1, where k x is the threshold value 3) if node x is the root node 4) set p root (0) = α 5) else
, where i is the subscript of a i = att(y) 10) end for 11) return pk p = {D y , D i } and A p = {a i }, where i is the subscript of a i = att(y), and y is the leaf node Let P denotes the policy set defined in Table II . When all the attribute trees are constructed by the Public-Key-Generation algorithm, TA will send {p i , pk pi , T pi , A pi } pi∈P to the APPVerifier, and then distribute {p i , A pi } pi∈P to each application App i ∈ AP P .
Private-Key-Generation: TA generates the private keys for each applicaiton App i ∈ AP P . The private key includes two components: (1)the base component, and (2)the attribute component. The algorithm is described in Algorithm 3, which works as follows. Algorithm 3 Private-Key-Generation Input: msk, params and A Output: sk: the private key 1) randomly choose u ∈ Z q 2) compute k 0 = g
TA takes a random u ∈ Z p and compute the base component of the secret key k 0 = g
. Then for each attribute a i ∈ A, TA chooses λ i ∈ Z q randomly and set
as the attribute components of the secret key. Therefore, the secret key sk = (k 0 , {k i1 , k i2 } ai∈A ), where A is the system access structure.
After that, TA chooses the attribute components of the private key for each App i ∈ AP P based on its user access structure A ui , and delivers sk ui = (k 0 , {k i1 , k i2 } ai∈Au i ) to it securely.
Operation-Signing: An application should sign its operation with the attribute-based signature scheme before it sends the operation message to the controller. The operation-sign algorithm of our approach is shown in Algorithm 4, which works as follows.
Let m be the n-bit string that represents the operation message. The application firstly chooses a random s ∈ Z q and computes σ 0 = g s and σ 1 = H(m) s k 0 . Then for each a i ∈ A s , where A s = A p A u as a signing access structure, a random λ i ∈ Z p is chosen. TA computes
Therefore, a signature on the operation message m is constructed as σ = (σ 0 , σ 1 , {σ i1 , σ i2 } ai∈As ).
Algorithm 4 Operation-Signing
Operation-Verification: It is run by the APP-Verifier on the controller, when the controller receives an operation message. The Operation-Verification algorithm takes a signature σ, an operation message m and the public key pk p as inputs. If it is a valid signature on m, the algorithm will output accept. Otherwise it will output reject.
To verify the signature, a recursive function V erN ode(σ, pk p , x) is defined in the Operation-Verification Algorithm, where x is a node in the attribute tree. It outputs a group element of G T or fail, which works as follows.
For a node x in the attribute tree, the SAT algorithm T x (A v ) is firstly run to check if the node satisfies the attribute tree, where A v = A p A u as a verifying access structure. When T x (A v ) = 1 and x is a leaf node:
When T x(Au) = 1 and x is a non-leaf node, the V erN ode(σ, pk p , x) proceeds as follows: For all nodes z that are children of x, it calls V erN ode(σ, pk p , z) and stores the output as F z . Let S x be an arbitrary k x -sized set of child nodes z, i = index(z), S z = {index(z) : z ∈ S x }. Then it calculates:
where
as a lagrange interpolation item. otherwise, it returns fail. To verify the signature, the Operation-Verification Algorithm runs the function V erN ode(σ, pk p , x root ) to compute F root , where x root is the root node of the attribute tree. Then it checks if V == F root e(H(m), σ 0 )/e(g, σ 1 ).
The Operation-Verification Algorithm is described in Algorithm 5 as follows.
Algorithm 5 Operation-Verification
Input: m, σ and pk p Output: Result: the verification result 1) choose the root node x root in the attribute tree T 2) call function
If the Operation-Verification Algorithm returns accept, App-Verifier will accept the network operation message and send it to network devices in the data-plan layer. Otherwise, the App-Verifier will reject the network operation request.
III. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We have deployed a simple prototype of AC-PROT with the Pairing-Based Cryptography Library, and evaluated it on its granularity and actual time consumption.
A. Granularity Analysis
We compare AC-PROT to the current existing schemes [3] , [8] , which are also authentication schemes in SDN. As illustrated in Table IV , SE-Floodlight [3] offers a role-based source authentication for network operations, which recognizes all applications with only three roles. OperationCheckpoint [8] provides a permission management system, which can also manage the flow rule permissions of each application for the SDN controller. Our scheme represents a fine-grained access control model based on attribute-based signature scheme, which dynamically provides a more flexible way to manage the network operations of each application by access control policies. Thus, the granularity of network operation authentication is more finegrained compared with other schemes. In addition, it also achieves higher flexibility because the network administrator can modify these policies according to the dynamic SDN network state.
B. Time Consumption Analysis
We calculate the overhead of AC-PROT by two criteria: (i) the time consumption for an application to sign its network operations with the Attribute-based Signature Module in the signing phase, and (ii) the time consumption for the AppVerifier to verify signed network operations in the verification phase. The time consumption in both the signing and the verification phase is an important measure to estimate the performance of AC-PROT, because it determines how many network operations could be handled by AC-PROT. In our experiment, we construct the attribute tree for the access control policy as showed in Fig.2 , then run the signing and verification algorithm on a Linux machine with an Intel Core 4.0 GHz i7-6700K CPU. We test 200 network operation messages to measure the average time for the machine to sign and verify each operation message, respectively.
As shown in Fig.3 , the horizontal-axis corresponds to new operation to be signed, and the vertical-axis corresponds to the time cost to sign each message in signing phase. We can observe that the average time the machine takes to sign each operation message is about 22.4ms, which means that 2,678 new operation messages can be signed every minute with the Attribute-based Signature Module.
As illustrated in Fig.4 , the average time to verify each signed operation message is about 44.5ms. It means 1,348 newly network operations per minute can be handled on the machine. Therefore, AC-PROT is very efficient and absolutely acceptable by networks described in [1] , [3] , [4] , [7] . IV. CONCLUSION In this paper, we propose AC-PROT, an access control model to authenticate the validity of network operations from applications in SDN. The key challenge that we address is the lack of trust introduced by the open interface between the application plane and the control plane that knowledgeable adversaries can exploit. As there are no standard security definitions for the northbound API, a serious concern is whether a network operation that produced by an application can be trusted or not. Our proposed AC-PROT enables the control plane to shield the controller from varieties of malicious network operation attacks launched by applications without the granted access structure.
